|
|
|
NEW NUCLEAR RISK MODELS Chris Busby, PhD University of Liverpool/ Green Audit Scientific Secretary: European Committee on Radiation Risk UK Ministry of Defence Depleted Uranium Oversight Board (DUOB) UK Dept of Health Committee Examining Radiation Risks from Internal Emitters (CERRIE) Leader: Science/ Policy interface; Policy Information Network for Child Health and the Environment (PINCHE; European Union).
There are three areas I will try and cover:
Background Science 1: Physics and Maths; reductionism Life-Span Studies of the externally exposed survivors of the A-bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide most of the information used by official bodies such as ICRP and UNSCEAR to estimate risks of radiation exposure, irrespective of radiation quality or source or of whether the exposure is external or internal to the human body. The concept of absorbed dose as energy deposition averaged across relatively massive volumes of body tissue is fundamental to radiation protection standards. However, bodies such as ICRP and the UK Government's Committee Examining Radiation Risks of Internal Emitters (CERRIE) have acknowledged that, for some kinds of radioactivity within the body, heterogeneity of energy deposition undermines absorbed dose. Accordingly the European Committee on Radiation Risk (ECRR) has revived a concept the ICRP originally put forward to account for variations in the efficiency with which radiation causes cell death or mutation. Developing this approach the ECRR has proposed weighting factors or multipliers which can be applied to ICRPs risk estimates. The largest discrepancies between risks as conventionally modeled and those predicted by ECRR methodologies concern highly localised energy deposition from particles, notably of the reactor fuel elements Uranium and Plutonium. However, risks are also associated with elements which bind to DNA, e.g. Strontium-90 Barium-140 and interestingly also, Uranium, and in addition there are other considerations which are dealt with in the ECRR recommendations (ECRR2003). Official risk agencies at national and international level like UNSCEAR and NRPB follow ICRP and defend the status quo by denying the existence of epidemiological data showing higher risks than those predicted by ICRP's modelling. Recent examples of such denial include several independent studies showing 40% increases in cancer in the decade following the Chernobyl disaster and the sharp increase in infant leukemia independently observed in a number of countries in 1986-7. Changes in rates of infant mortality and leukaemia associated with atmospheric weapons tests in 1950s-60s provide further evidence of errors. These findings provide unequivocal evidence that ICRP's predictions are in error by a factor of between 100-fold and 1000-fold for certain types of internal exposure. Such errors are well within the range of the uncertainties reported by CERRIE, to which must be added variations in the radiation sensitivity of sub-populations of cells and of individual people. Since the fallout episodes referred to above resulted in very low public doses as conventionally modelled, these considerations have large implications for policies on routine emissions, decommissioning practice, reuse and recycling of contaminated materials and radioactive waste. However, existing policies are deeply entrenched within treaty obligations and circular systems of scientific advice. Agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (euratom) are constitutionally committed to fostering nuclear energy; the European Union maintains a system of gathering scientific advice only from conventional sources; the World Health Organisation's freedom and willingness to conduct research into radiation health effects are constrained by a 1957 agreement which gives IAEA a right of veto. This has clearly contstrained the WHO in its natural duty to examine the health effects of the Chernobyl accident (ECRR2006). Objective assessment of the effects of exposure to radioactivity at levels commonly found in the environment is blurred by subjective judgements such as the ICRP's assumption of an outdated utilitarian ethic which submerges the rights of the individual beneath considerations of public benefit, and statutory requirements that regulators shall apply the concept of "reasonableness" to radiation exposures as well as weighing the resulting health detriment against social and economic factors connected with the polluting industry. We can summarise the problem at this stage:
The risk models presently underpinning legal exposure limits are wrong when applied to internal exposures from fission products and anthropogenically enhanced natural radionuclides (depleted uranium). This has now been demonstrated fully both theoretically and through epidemiology. The scientific method has not been employed if assessing risk. The basis for internal exposure risk assessment is still the external acute high dose Japanese A-Bomb study. I now briefly explain how this error has come about. For external irradiation all cells receive the same dose. But for internal irradiation some cells can receive high doses which cause proportionately greater effects. Internal irradiation from radioactive particles causes high ionisation density near DNA, the accepted target, than the same dose delivered externally. Examples are Uranium fuel particles from Chernobyl, Plutonium oxide particles, Uranium oxide particles (DU), reprocessing wastes in sea sediment. Internal irradiation from certain fission-product isotopes which have a high chemical affinity for DNA cause high ionisation density near DNA than the same dose delivered externally. Examples are Strontium, Barium, Uranium, Plutonium, Tritium This is the theoretical basis for understanding how the health effects of internal irradiation from nuclear pollution have been underestimated. However there is plenty of evidence also from epidemiology. The problem has been that nuclear issues have been tied to military use of atomic weapons. Deductive logic employed by the physics based models together with the links with Cold War military needs and the existence of powerful nuclear lobbies has now resulted the deaths of millions of adults, children and infants from exposures to radioactive fission products since 1950. Epidemiological evidence includes infant mortality from atmospheric tests, cancer and leukemia in test veterans and nuclear workers, childhood cancer near nuclear sites, genetic damage and heritable effects and adult cancer from nuclear test fallout, nuclear accidents like Chernobyl and Windscale, the breast cancer epidemic, cancer in coastal populations near contaminated sediment and genetic effects from exposure to uranium munitions. In the last ten or fifteen years there have also been new scientific and epidemiological discoveries e.g
The European Committee on Radiation Risk examined the overall Mortality Yield of Nuclear Pollution (ECRR2003). Using epidemiology and examining trends in cancer mortality and infant mortality, and official data on exposure, ECRR 2003 has calculated that the nuclear pollution of the planet from 1950 to 1989 has caused: 123,000,000 cancers 857,000 infant deaths 1,600,000 foetal deaths Loss of life quality due to genetic diseases of 10%
The ICRP model yield is 1,100,000 fatal cancers only Of course, collisions between philosophical or scientific belief and reality are nothing new. Examples include: Galileo vs Aristotle and the Church Newton vs Descartes Darwin and the Church Phlogiston Theory and Oxygen Relativity vs Aether History has shown that when there are powerful interests involved despite observation and empirical science, hundreds of years have to pass before new ideas are accepted. In the case of radiation there are significant consequences
In the Table 1 below, I list some of the highlights in the recent history of the paradigm shift over the health effects of low dose radiation.
How is it possible to win a radiation case, or convince a politician, in the area of low dose radiation exposure? The answer is that it is very difficult. In the Andersen fairytale, the King believed he was wearing new clothes: he was afraid to think for himself in case he appeared foolish. In the same way, non scientists (judges, politicians) have been persuaded for example that the childhood leukaemia cluster ten times the national average rate which exists near the most radioactively polluted site in the UK, Sellafield, is not caused by the radiation, even knowing that radiation is the main known cause of the disease and no other plausible explanation exists. Such sleight of hand should not be believed outside of a fairy tale: yet through the magical lenses of science, what might appear to ordinary people as clear and obvious correlations are magically made to disappear. The politicians and judges cannot think for themselves and have to ask the expert; in this case, scientific experts who work for the nuclear industry, or believe those who do. A good example was the case of the mad cow disease where the scientific advice committees told the government in the UK what it wanted to hear. Later, of course, they were seen to be wrong. It is interesting that the chair of this committee Sir Richard Southwood, was also the chair of the National Radiological Protection Board, at the same time and for some time after. In this affair, many independent scientists (e.g. Richard Lacey) told the government and the committee that it was wrong. They were ignored. Lacey was told by one government Minister to keep taking the tablets. What must independent scientists do? In this area, where credibility is so necessary, we must create it. To speak truth to power and be believed, we must fashion strategic levers. I list Four:
I have used all of these with greater or less success upon occasion. But I have to say that nothing much can be achieved without a basic level of funding, of financial support, and for this I have to thank a number of charitable organisations, the main among which is the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. I will turn to some Legal Cases I have been involved with:
Legal cases involving science are carried out differently in the UK and the USA.
1. English Law What is an expert? Which expert is correct? Who is objective? Whom do we believe? English Law has 3 systems; for criminal damage below £10,000 a magistrate court; above £10,000 a jury; for torts involving radiation exposure there is a Judge. Expert witnesses are called by both sides. The magistrates and the Judge usually find for side that has the official expert witness whose credibility stems from their qualifications and affiliations. The point is, they do not understand the science and ignore the evidence but defer to the expert with the fanciest uniform or the biggest golden crown. Juries usually listen to the evidence and find for the most plausible argument and evidence. Thus the Sellafield trial, a tort trial, was lost. On the other hand, the direct action women who cut fences and attacked bombers or spray painted slogans went into court in front of a jury (if their crimes were big enough). These criminal damage trials were generally won because the jury would listen to me and weight the evidence. The Pensions Tribunal was won because no credible witness appeared for the Ministry of defence to answer the ECRR arguments I advanced to argue that the A-bomb test veteran Gerald Adsheads brain tumour was causally related to his exposure. The key here is that the judge does not believe the expert witness that has the lesser credibility, whatever the arguments. The jury does. And this is also true in the USA, but because of this, in the USA the system has found a way to bypass the jury so that the expert never gets to the jury.
2. Addressing credibility: US Law Unlike UK, exposure torts in the US are decided by a jury. Prior to 1995 this resulted in many environmental exposure claims/ drug reaction claims being upheld. All this changed in 1993 following a ruling by the US Supreme Court in the Case Daubert vs Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. This gave the judges the right to exclude experts from giving evidence to juries. Judges were expected to exclude experts if they believed that their evidence was not sound science. This was decided following a pre trial deposition in which the defence interrogated the scientist and attempted to destroy the experts credentials or pour scorn on their affiliation or research. In effect this Daubert procedure then became the real trial but was conducted away from the jury who were not allowed to see the arguments. Only the judge saw the arguments and decided. This major change put the judge in the same position as the UK judge of deciding who was credible witness, and like the UK judge, this usually resulted in exclusion of any new science (since new science cannot be sound science if it disagrees with what has gone before). In the St Lucie case in Florida where I was an expert, the expert witness who calculated the doses to the children who had brain tumours was excluded by the judge under Daubert since the judge believed the evidence put forward by the defence (the American Nuclear Insurers and Florida Power and Light) that his evidence was unsound. There was no way in which the judge could have understood the reasoning, and indeed in his judgement handed down he makes some significant errors and shows clearly that he has not understood the science. Yet he has excluded the prosecution expert witness. If this case had got to the jury it would have been cut and dried. However the political fallout for nuclear industry would have been fatal for it.
Four Court Cases: 1. Short and Others vs BNFL In early 1990s 4 plaintiffs from County Louth in North East Ireland obtained leave in Irish High Court to sue BNFL over the contamination of the Irish sea and consequent effects on health and psychological damage In 1997 I was funded by the Irish State to examine health effects on the Irish Sea coast of Wales and Ireland using official data. Green Audit found a significant sea coast effect on cancer associated with local (1-2km) exposure to contaminated silt resuspended by sea to land transfer. This effect has been described now at various conferences and is part of the CERRIE evidence and in reports by the British Nuclear Energy Society (2002). It has been found in further studies by Green Audit near similarly contaminated coastal communities near Hinkley Point nuclear power station in Somerset and also Bradwell Essex. Case has been slowed down by legal arguments but is on-going 2005 Childhood cancer in Wales: Irish sea effects 1974-89
Four Court Cases: 2. Nibby David David sued Honeywell, his employer alleging that he was contaminated with Depleted Uranium at work He was ill from lung fibrosis and kidney problems, had urine measurements showing DU and chromosome test results suggesting exposure to radiation Defence argued that they never used DU and never worked with radiation Late in the trial, it emerged from discovery that defendants had been licenced for radiation work because of dismantling aero engines contaminated with weapons fallout dust. The dust contained uranium. This evidence was disallowed by the judge as irrelevant to the claim Legal aid was refused; Nibby Davids health collapsed and he was unable to continue the case. The defence put forward a plea that the judge order their expenses to be paid by the expert witness (me) and the McKenzie friend as they argued that the case would have not carried on unless I had been advising David or if I had not unreasonably pursued my beliefs about the effects of radiation. The judgement has now been handed down for the defence. The key was the exclusion of the fallout exposures David received from dust in the building where the aero engines were serviced. Yet this crucial evidence came out late under discovery.
3. Oil Pipe workers vs Exxon, New Orleans Several workers with cancer involved in de-scaling oil pipes sued their employer alleging that the radioactive dust they were exposed to (containing uranium and radium) caused their illness. Defence argued that the doses were too low ECRR considerations were put forward; doses were reassessed using concept of Working Level Months employed in the assessment of cancer risks in underground workers and miners. First case won 2005; second case settled last week.
4. Finestone and Blake vs. Florida Power and Light Parents of two children who developed brain and central nervous system tumours sued operators of local nuclear plant, St Lucie, Florida RPHP (Sternglass, Gould) in New York measured Strontium-90 in childrens teeth with cancer in the area; significantly higher in the children with cancer than controls Florida Dept of Health carried out a huge case control study on chemical exposures and showed that chemicals could not explain the cancer cluster The plant is situated on the sea and on a waterway and releases material to the sea which contaminates the mud in the same way as in the Irish sea, with the same effects Under discovery, evidence appears that the operators took contaminated sludge and dumped it on fields in populated areas Daubert applies; Experts were excluded (not me as it happened, though that is irrelevant). Case was thrown out but is being appealed.
I summarise finally what I believe to be the way forward Alternative Institutions To Generate Credibility Require Funding
Court cases have to put experts in front of juries Science has to use Induction and not Deduction We must realise that this is a matter of politics and not science; and that huge sums of money; systems of power and dead children are part of the decisions that are made
For those who are interested in the science I refer them to the reports of the ECRR to be obtainable by ordering through www.euradcom.org and to also look at the website of the Low Level Radiation Campaign www.llrc.org I myself would welcome inputs from legal experts on how to use the law to force a reappraisal of radiation risk and how we might obtain the impartial and logical assessment of the evidence in a court of law.
Chris Busby Green Audit For PLAGE |